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I. INTRODUCTION
September 16, 2007 has been called Baghdad's "Bloody
Sunday."' On that scorching afternoon in Baghdad, Iraq, a team of
Blackwater Worldwide 2 private military contractors slew seventeen
Iraqi civilianS3 and wounded twenty-seven others.4 A Blackwater
spokesperson claimed that the civilian contractors reacted in response
to an attack by enemy combatants and "heroically defended American
lives."5 Despite such claims, U.S. soldiers who arrived at the scene
within twenty-five minutes found no evidence of enemy activity and
characterized the event as criminal.6 Despite such evidence and
notwithstanding four potential sources of criminal law-international
law, host-nation law, U.S. civilian law, and U.S. military law-these
Blackwater guards escaped criminal accountability for their actions on
Bloody Sunday.7 Such private citizens employed by the U.S. military
in undeclared wars had fallen into a legal loophole, practically beyond
the reach of criminal law. They had become "the Untouchables."8
Prior to Bloody Sunday, Congress had recognized that
something must be done to bridge this gap and amended U.S. military
law in 2007 to bring the Untouchables within the grasp of criminal
law.9 This Note examines the legal loophole into which modern private
military contractors had fallen and concludes that U.S. military law
can, and should, be used to hold them criminally accountable.
1. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
MERCENARY ARMY 4 (Nation Books 2008) (2007).
2. In early 2009, Blackwater Worldwide (usually referred to simply as "Blackwater")
changed its name to Xe (pronounced like the letter Z). Dana Hedgpeth, Behind the Blackwater
Name Change, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2009, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.
com/governmentinc/2009/02/behind_the -blackwater namecha.html. For simplicity, this Note
will continue to use the name Blackwater.
3. Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability Measures for Private
Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INTL L. 259, 259 (2008).
4. Michael Hurst, After Blackwater: A Mission-Focused Jurisdictional Regime for Private
Military Contractors During Contingency Operations, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1308, 1309 (2008).
5. Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Contractor Banned by Iraq Over Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/world/middleeast/18iraq.html.
6. Sudarsan Raghavan & Josh White, Blackwater Guards Fired at Fleeing Cars, Soldiers
Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/1 1/AR2007101101030_3.html?hpid=topnews.
7. Five Blackwater guards were charged under U.S. civilian law for manslaughter and
weapons violations relating to Bloody Sunday; however, a federal judge dismissed the charges.
Associated Press, Iraqis Outraged as Blackwater Case Thrown Out: Baghdad Vows to Pursue
Charges Against Security Firm Accused in Killings, MSNBC, Jan. 1, 2010, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/34660136/ns/worldnews-mideastnafrical.
8. Cf. THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987).
9. Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006).
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Private military contractors ("PMCs" or "contractors"), like the
Blackwater employees, have assumed a pivotal role in U.S. foreign
relations and combat worldwide. Following a reduction in the general
size of U.S. armed forces, the government has turned increasingly to
PMCs to perform many functions previously carried out by military
personnel.10 Although these contractors had initially provided mere
auxiliary support to the military by supplying instruction, mail
delivery, and food services," an overextended U.S. military soon
utilized PMCs globally in a wide variety of vital roles, 12 such as
"interrogators, complex systems operators, . . . [and] security for high
profile politicians and military commanders." 3
P.W. Singer, a senior fellow and director of the 21st Century
Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution,14 has recently
identified three classifications of firms, based on the services they
provide, that supply PMCs to the U.S. military: (1) military support
firms that deliver "supplementary military services . . . including
logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and transportation";
(2) military consulting firms that supply "advisory and training
services integral to the operation and restructuring of a client's armed
forces"; and (3) military provider firms that focus on the tactical
environment by running active combat operations. 15 PMCs who come
from military provider firms operate "at the forefront of the
battlespace, by engaging in actual fighting ... and/or direct command
and control of field units."16 Such contractors, like those involved in
Bloody Sunday, essentially act in a quasi-military capacity. These
10. Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial
Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367, 381-82.
11. Id. at 383.
12. Id. ("[PMCs] provide an unparalleled breadth of support to the U.S. active-duty military
force. From providing instructors and manning the day-to-day operations of the Army's Reserve
Officer Training Corps' programs; to writing Army Field Manuals; to teaching career senior
Army officers graduate-level courses in the military decision-making process and the details of
staff planning; to providing mail delivery, food service, power generation, water distribution,
refueling, and vehicle maintenance and repair in combat zones; PMFs have become
indispensable to the United States' ability to wage war.").
13. Katherine Jackson, Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier: How Five Words Could
Subject Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military Jurisdiction, 27 J. NAT'L
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 255, 255 (2007).
14. Brookings Experts, http://www.brookings.edulexperts/s/singerp.aspx (last visited Apr. 2,
2010).
15. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY




quasi-military PMCs dress like soldiers, bear arms like soldiers, and
fill quintessential soldier roles.17
The U.S. military's use of PMCs in modern times-since the
early 1990s-has reached an unprecedented level.18 As of late 2007,
PMCs in Iraq outnumbered military personnel 180,000 to 165,000,
with between 20,000 and 30,000 contractors in quasi-military roles. 19
As one of the main suppliers of PMCs to the U.S. military, Blackwater
provided security to U.S. officials who visited Iraq.20 In performing
their roles as bodyguards, Blackwater employees frequently escorted
U.S. officials through Baghdad in armed convoys. 21 For Iraqi police
officers, it became "a standard part of their workday in occupied Iraq
to stop traffic to make room for U.S. VIPs, protected by heavily armed
private soldiers, to blaze through."22
On Bloody Sunday, what began as a routine traffic stop by
Blackwater contractors escorting U.S. diplomats ended in a hail of
gunfire and Iraqi outrage. 23 Around noon, the convoy escort, including
four heavily armored vehicles, entered Nissour Square in downtown
Baghdad. 24 After Iraqi police attempted to block traffic in order to let
the convoy through quickly, the convoy's vehicles made an unexpected
U-turn and began driving the wrong way down a one-way street.25
According to eyewitnesses, "a large white man with a mustache,
positioned atop the third vehicle . . . began to fire his weapon
'randomly.' "26 When the Blackwater contractors shot and killed the
driver of one vehicle, his car began to roll forward towards the
convoy. 27 The situation quickly "spiraled into a shooting spree" as the
Blackwater forces opened fire upon the square in all directions. 28
Witnesses recounted how men, women, and children were shot and
killed while attempting to flee. 29 After approximately fifteen minutes,
17. See Robert W. Wood, Independent Contractor vs. Employee and Blackwater, 70 MONT. L.
REV. 95, 95 (2009).
18. Hurst, supra note 4, at 1310.
19. Id.
20. SCAHILL, supra note 1, at 13.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3-9.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 7-9 ("I saw women and children jump out of their cars and start to crawl on the
road to escape being shot .... But still the firing kept coming and many of them were killed."
(citing Kim Sengupta, The Real Story of Baghdad's Bloody Sunday, INDEPENDENT (London),
[Vol. 63:4:10471050
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the melee finally ended, leaving seventeen Iraqis dead and over
twenty wounded. 30
Unfortunately, Bloody Sunday provides a prime example of
how the use of contractors may actually undermine the U.S. military's
effectiveness worldwide. Referring the Nissour Square Shootings,
Major Jeffrey S. Thurnher emphasized how PMCs could actually be
detrimental to military missions overseas, and the Iraqi mission in
particular.31 Explaining that PMCs are simply one cog in the
Department of Defense's "'Total Force' machine," Thurnher argued
that PMCs must work cohesively with the other elements of the battle
force. 32 Because contractors also supply more manpower than the U.S.
military in Iraq, "[h]aving such a large contractor force on the
battlefield without adequate oversight is dangerous and
irresponsible." 33
Additionally, one of the main missions of the
counterinsurgency in Iraq is to win local support,34 but the use of
PMCs can frustrate this goal. When contractors engage in seemingly
criminal conduct, as in the shootings on Bloody Sunday, the local
populace often fails to distinguish contractors from military personnel.
As a result, "[i]n many Iraqi minds, the perceived failures of
Blackwater contractors to safeguard Iraqi lives are attributed simply
as American failures."35 This response is evident from Iraq's Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki's description of the "sense of tension and
anger among all Iraqis, including the government, over [the Bloody
Sunday] crime."36 In fact, much of the counterinsurgency efforts in
Iraq came to a grinding halt immediately after the Nissour Square
shootings when the Department of State "ordered all non-U.S.
military officials to remain inside the Green Zone" and stopped all
diplomatic convoys.37
Sept. 21, 2007)); see also Raghavan & White, supra note 6, at A01 ("It appeared to me they were
fleeing the scene when they were engaged. It had every indication of an excessive shooting.").
30. SCAHILL, supra note 1, at 6.
31. Major Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Drowning in Blackwater: How Weak Accountability over




34. Id. at 66.
35. Id.
36. SCAHILL, supra note 1, at 13 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Steve Fainaru, Where




Although not the only incident of possible criminal conduct by
civilian contractors accompanying the U.S. military,38 the Nissour
Square shootings highlight the current lack of accountability for
quasi-military PMCs. Iraqi backlash from Baghdad's Bloody Sunday
was swift: within twenty-four hours, the Interior Ministry had banned
Blackwater from the country.39 Yet, four days later, Blackwater
contractors were back in Iraq.40 The return of Blackwater forces to
Iraq so soon after the Nissour Square shootings are largely
attributable to the U.S. military's remarkable reliance on
contractors.41
PMCs must be held accountable for their criminal actions, not
merely to provide personal justice for those injured by their crimes,
but also for the strategic objectives of organizing the U.S. military's
available manpower effectively and retaining the support of citizens
both domestic and abroad. At the same time, it is simply impractical
to bring criminal sanctions against all PMCs for every possible crime
that they might commit. Criminal sanctions against contractors
should, at the very least, reach egregious crimes and should focus on
quasi-military PMCs. Operating at the battlefront, quasi-military
PMCs pose the greatest threat to the U.S. military's ability to control
the contingency operation. Additionally, because they bear arms and
wear uniforms like members of the U.S. military, the local populace is
more likely to attribute their actions to the U.S. military. By providing
justice for victims, criminal sanctions will further the strategic goal of
winning the locals' support and trust during counterinsurgency
efforts.
Unfortunately, while the use of PMCs has grown rapidly in the
past decade, the legal apparatus to hold them accountable has failed
to keep pace. Currently, four distinct sources of criminal law may hold
contractors accountable for their actions: (1) international law, (2)
host-nation law, (3) U.S. civilian law, and (4) U.S. military law.4 2 As
this Note will explain, numerous technical, practical, and evidentiary
problems have effectively made the first three forms unworkable. The
remaining option is U.S. military law in the form of the Uniform Code
38. Id. at 10-12 (describing the killings of an Iraqi Vice President's bodyguard by an
intoxicated Blackwater operative and of three Iraqi security guards by a Blackwater sniper);
Peters, supra note 10, at 369-70 (recounting the death by hypothermia of a suspected Sunni
insurgent in an Army-run prison after Red River Group contractors beat him with a flashlight,
hosed him down with cold water, and left him chained and naked overnight).
39. SCAHILL, supra note 1, at 9.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id.
42. Hurst, supra note 4, at 1309-10.
[Vol. 63:4:10471052
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of Military Justice43 ("UCMJ"), which underwent a significant
jurisdictional expansion in 2007. Prior to 2007, the UCMJ had applied
to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field
during "times of war,"4 4 which had been interpreted to mean a
congressionally declared war.4 5 Because Congress had not declared
war in over sixty-five years, the UCMJ had been an ineffective tool for
prosecuting PMCs. 46
However, within the over three thousand provisions of the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, Congress
"clarif[ied]" the UCMJ by making it applicable to persons serving with
or accompanying an armed force in the field during a "declared war or
a contingency operation."47 With the addition of these five words and
little legislative history, Congress revived the constitutionality
question of subjecting civilians to military jurisdiction.48
Despite the constitutionality question, this Note argues that
the UCMJ presents the best option for holding quasi-military PMCs
criminally accountable. A contractually based application of the UCMJ
can and should be used as the source for criminal sanctions against
quasi-military PMCs, at least for noncapital crimes with civilian
analogues. Part II provides background regarding the rise of
contractors in augmenting military forces and the UCMJ generally.
Part III argues that the UCMJ should be applied to hold contractors
criminally accountable by examining the other three potential sources
of criminal law-international law, host-nation law, and U.S. civilian
law-and arguing that each is ineffective in achieving that goal. In
light of these inadequacies, Part III concludes that the UCMJ provides
the best source for criminal sanctions against PMCs because of its
practical and equitable benefits.
Part IV argues that the UCMJ can be applied constitutionally
if three limitations exist: (1) its application must be stated expressly
in the contractors' contracts; (2) it can only apply to quasi-military
PMCs; and (3) it must, at least initially, be restricted to noncapital
crimes with civilian analogues. Part IV.A reviews the constitutional
43. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006).
44. Id. § 801(a)(10)-(12).
45. United States v. Avarette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970).
46. Kara Sacilotto, Jumping the (Un)Constitutional Gun?: Constitutional Questions in the
Application of the UCMJ to Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 179, 180 (2008).
47. Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (emphasis added).
48. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the Battlefield: A Proposal
for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military-Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilian
Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491, 494 (2008) ("Mhe scope of jurisdiction this amendment
established raises troubling constitutional and pragmatic concerns.").
2010] 1053
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framework for applying U.S. military law to civilians pre- and post-
UCMJ. Part IV.B then examines each of the three limitations and
demonstrates how they bring the application of the UCMJ to PMCs
within Congress's power to regulate the armed forces. At the same
time, it concludes that such restrictions would not destroy the
effectiveness of the UCMJ as the source of criminal sanctions.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE UNTOUCHABLES
Use of civilians by militaries is "as old as war itself,"49 and
military law has developed over the years in an attempt to encompass
them. This Part provides background into the evolution of both
civilian contractors and military law. Section A focuses on the rise of
civilian contractors from the Revolutionary War to modern times.
Section B considers the development of military law from the
American Articles of War to the UCMJ.
A. The Growth of Modern Civilian Contractors
Despite condemning the use of mercenaries, 50 the U.S. military
has not shied away from relying upon civilian support in noncombat
contexts.51 During the Revolutionary War, civilians provided
numerous vital services, such as transportation, food, and medicine. 52
Over the centuries that followed, civilians continued to accompany the
U.S. military, both in camp and in the field,53 by providing logistical
support. 54 Certain categories of civilians at times were subject to
military jurisdiction and courts-martial based on their
interrelationships with military personnel.5 5
During the Vietnam War, however, a dramatic change occurred
in the functions and services provided to the military by civilians. This
war marked the beginning of the rise in contractors. At the height of
the United States's involvement in Vietnam, 9,000 PMCs served
alongside 550,000 members of the U.S. armed forces. 56 Two trends in
the Cold War era of the 1980s further weakened the government's
49. SINGER, supra note 15, at 19.
50. ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE NEW MERCENARIES: THE HISTORY OF THE HIRED SOLDIER
FROM THE CONGO TO THE SEYCHELLES 5 (1985).
51. Thurnher, supra note 31, at 67 ("The United States has fully participated in this rich
tradition of using contractors on the battlefield.").
52. Id.
53. Peters, supra note 10, at 376.
54. Thurnher, supra note 31, at 67.
55. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
56. Peters, supra note 10, at 380.
1054 [Vol. 63:4:1047
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military monopoly and opened the door for private companies to
provide additional personnel and services.57 First, arms proliferation
allowed private actors to purchase weapons for military use. Second,
large militaries with many soldiers were no longer needed to fight
conflicts, thereby enabling smaller, private armies to assume combat
duties.58
After the end of the Cold War, both the first Bush
Administration and the Clinton Administration initiated an extreme
downsizing of military forces, eventually cutting the active-duty force
by 30 percent.59 At the same time, the United States began deploying
military forces in humanitarian roles across the world, from the
Balkans to Somalia. 60 Thus the modern private military industry
surfaced in the early 1990s as a result of three factors: (1) the end of
the Cold War; (2) the blurring of the line between civilians and
soldiers as PMCs increasingly filled roles previously filled by military
personnel; and (3) a "general trend toward privatization and
outsourcing of government functions around the world."61 This
decrease in the size of active military personnel, combined with the
increase in deployments abroad, led to the development of private
military firms organized and run as for-profit corporations.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, when combined with these trends,
resulted in a dramatic escalation of the U.S. military's use of
contractors. 62 The choice to conduct combat operations in Iraq
simultaneously with reconstruction and economic-development efforts
forced the overextended military to rely on PMCs to an extraordinary
degree.63 As of late 2007, PMCs, including 20,000 to 30,000 armed
contractors, outnumbered military personnel 180,000 to 165,000 in
Iraq.6 4 These PMCs hailed from the United States, Iraq, and other
nations and worked under numerous federal contracts to provide
services that ranged from building roads to gathering intelligence.65
Such reliance raised several concerns, including whether the U.S.
military could function properly without the support of contractors.66
57. Jackson, supra note 13, at 259.
58. Id. at 258-59.
59. Peters, supra note 10, at 381.
60. Id.
61. P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 120 (2005).
62. Thurnher, supra note 31, at 67.
63. Richard Lardner, 180,000 Private Contractors Flood Iraq, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynl/content/article/2007/09/19/AR200709
1901836.html.
64. Hurst, supra note 4, at 1310.




Additionally, it remained unclear how PMCs who engaged in combat,
"a sharp departure from previous conflicts," fit into the military
machinery.67 The numbers and roles of contractors in Iraq
demonstrate just how indispensable PMCs have become to the U.S.
military.68 However, the criminal law necessary to hold modern PMCs
accountable for their actions has failed to keep pace with the rise of
PMCs-until recently.
B. The Evolution of Military Law: The UCMJ and the Court-Martial
System
Prior to the enactment of the UCMJ in 1950, the authority to
subject civilians to military jurisdiction stemmed from the American
Articles of War of 1775 and 1916. As the Supreme Court noted in
Madsen v. Kinsella, Article XXXII of the American Articles of War of
1775, which was taken from the British Articles of War, permitted
military court-martial jurisdiction over "sutlers" and "retainers"
accompanying the Army in the field.69 A sutler was a "civilian seller of
ale, victuals and other merchandise."70 A retainer "encompassed
officers' servants and camp-followers attending the army but not in
the public service."71 As Colonel William Winthrop explained in 1896,
this provision of the Articles of War "has always been interpreted as
subjecting [sutlers and retainers], not only to the orders made for the
government and discipline of the command to which they may be
attached, but also to trial by court-martial for violations of the
military code." 72 The 1916 Articles of War contained essentially the
same provision. 73
In an exercise of its power over U.S. military forces, 74 Congress
passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") in 1950 and
reestablished the military's customary capacity to prosecute civilians
accompanying armed forces.75 Military jurisdiction under the UCMJ
67. Id.
68. Peters, supra note 10, at 383.
69. 343 U.S. 341, 349 n.15 (1952).
70. Major Stephen E. Castlen, Let the Good Times Role: Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
Operations, 1996 ARMY LAW. 3, 5.
71. Colonel Lawrence J. Schwarz, The Case for Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilians
Under Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 ARMY LAW. 31, 31 n.82
(quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 98 (2d. ed., 1920) (1896)).
72. WINTHROP, supra note 71, at 98.
73. Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 189.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
75. Richard Morgan, Professional Military Firms under International Law, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L.
213, 229 (2008).
[Vol. 63:4:10471056
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maintains several crucial procedural differences from U.S. civilian
law. The accused can claim neither the Fifth Amendment's right to an
indictment by a grand jury nor the Sixth Amendment's right to a trial
by a jury of his peers. Instead, the UCMJ contains three different
types of courts-martial that provide their own procedural protections:
(1) general courts-martial; (2) special courts-martial; and (3) summary
courts-martial. 76
General courts-martial typically consist of a military judge and
at least five court members, although a military judge can preside
over a general court-martial alone.77 General courts-martial have
jurisdiction over "any offense" under the UCMJ, including capital
crimes.78 Special courts-martial usually consist of a military judge,
three court members, or both.79 Special courts-martial generally retain
jurisdiction over noncapital offenses.80 Finally, summary courts-
martial involve one commissioned officer.81 The jurisdiction of
summary courts-martial is far less expansive than the two other
classifications: they retain jurisdiction only over noncapital offenses
and cannot try many low-level military personnel.82 Additionally, an
accused maintains the right to object to a summary court-martial and
demand trial by special or general court-martial.83
With regard to substantive law, the UCMJ criminal provisions
contain offenses with and without civilian analogues. 84 For example,
the UCMJ's punitive articles prohibit murder,85 manslaughter, 86 and
76. Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 207.
77. 10 U.S.C. § 816; Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 207.
78. 10 U.S.C. § 818; Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 207-08. However, general courts-martial
consisting of one military judge cannot try capital cases "unless the case has been previously
referred to trial as a noncapital case." 10 U.S.C. § 818.
79. 10 U.S.C. § 816(2); Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 207.
80. 10 U.S.C. § 819; Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 208.
81. 10 U.S.C. § 816(3); Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 207.
82. 10 U.S.C. § 820; Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 208.
83. 10 U.S.C. § 820; Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 208.
84. 10 U.S.C. §§ 880-933.
85. Id. § 918 ("Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse,
unlawfully kills a human being, when he[:] (1) has a premeditated design to kill; (2) intends to
kill or inflict great bodily harm; (3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to another
and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or (4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated
sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child,
aggravated sexual contact with a child, robbery, or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder. . . ").
86. Id. § 919(a)-(b) ("Any person subject to this chapter who, with an intent to kill or inflict
great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of sudden passion caused by
adequate provocation is guilty of voluntary manslaughter . .. [while] [a]ny person subject to this
chapter who, without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human
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robbery.87 Such crimes have easily identifiable civilian counterparts.
On the other hand, the UCMJ also criminalizes actions that have no
civilian analogues, including aiding the enemy88 and malingering.89
Additionally, the UCMJ contains a catchall provision that includes
those offenses that interfere with the military's good order and
discipline and those that bring discredit to the military.90 The catchall
provision also covers any noncapital crime not already defined in the
UCMJ.9 1
For civilians accompanying the military, the UCMJ originally
applied during "times of war."92 In 1970, the Court of Military Appeals
construed this language to mean that the UCMJ could only be applied
to civilians during a congressionally declared war.93 As the highest
military court, the Court of Military Appeals essentially halted any
application of military jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the
military because Congress had not officially declared war since World
War II.94 Thus, for over thirty years, the UCMJ was not an option for
holding modern PMCs criminally accountable for their actions.
In 2006, Congress dramatically changed this landscape by
"clarifying" the UCMJ as applying to civilian contractors serving with
or accompanying an armed force in the field during a "declared war or
a contingency operation."95 These five words, somewhat hidden in a
massive military omnibus bill, opened the door for applying the UCMJ
being[:] (1) by culpable negligence; or (2) while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an
offense . . . directly affecting the person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter ... .").
87. Id. § 922 ("Any person subject to this chapter who with intent to steal takes anything of
value from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of force or
violence or fear of immediate or future injury to his person or property or to the person or
property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the
robbery, is guilty of robbery. . . ").
88. Id. § 904 ("Any person who[:] (1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms,
ammunition, supplies, money, or other things; or (2) without proper authority, knowingly
harbors or protects or gives intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any
intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or such other
punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.").
89. Id. § 915 ("Any person subject to this chapter who for the purpose of avoiding work,
duty, or service[:] (1) feigns illness, physical disablement, mental lapse or derangement; or (2)
intentionally inflicts self-injury; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
90. Id. § 934.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 801(a)(10)-(12) (2006).
93. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970).
94. Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Between War and Peace: Exploring the Constitutionality of
Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the Uniform Code of Military Justice During
"Contingency Operations,"86 N.C. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2008).
95. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (emphasis added).
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to PMCs. 96 At the same time, these words also revived the main
objection to military jurisdiction over civilians: that application of the
UCMJ unconstitutionally deprives civilians of the legal protections
that they would otherwise receive in a U.S. civilian court.97 However,
these constitutional objections are not insurmountable.98 Given the
remarkable increase in the use of modern PMCs, the UCMJ should
hold them criminally accountable because it represents the most
viable and effective source of criminal sanctions. Additionally, the
UCMJ's jurisdiction over quasi-military PMCs should be within
Congress's power to regulate the armed forces when initially restricted
to noncapital crimes with civilian analogues. With this clarification of
the UCMJ, Congress provided the tool necessary to bring the
Untouchables within the embrace of criminal law.
III. THE UCMJ SHOULD BE USED TO HOLD PMCS CRIMINALLY
ACCOUNTABLE
As the number of modern contractors increases at a rapid pace,
the need to hold them criminally accountable for their actions for both
moral and strategic reasons has also increased. Currently, four
sources of law could subject PMCs to criminal sanctions for their
actions: (1) international law; (2) host-nation law; (3) U.S. civilian law;
and (4) U.S. military law. Unfortunately, the first three have failed to
evolve along with the unprecedented use of modern PMCs, thereby
rendering them ineffective for holding such contractors criminally
accountable. An examination of these three potential sources of
criminal law reveals that U.S. military law under the UCMJ remains
the only viable option.
A. International Law: The Geneva Conventions
International law, in the form of the Geneva Conventions,
could potentially subject PMCs to criminal sanctions because it
contains prohibitions against the use of mercenaries. However, the
96. Jackson, supra note 13, at 256 n.5 (quoting P.W. Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private
Militaries, Embeds, DEFENSE TECH., Jan. 3, 2007, available at http://defensetech.org/2007/01/03/
the-law-catches-up-to-private-militaries-embeds).
97. See Anthony E. Giardino, Note, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute
Violations of the Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699, 719
(2007) (citing Stephen Fidler & Demetri Sevastopulo, Civilian Workers Could Face Court
Martial, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4126e5fe-a068-lldb-
acff-0000779e2340.html?nclick check=1; Griff Witte, New Law Could Subject Civilians to
Military Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2007, at Al).
98. See infra Part IV.B.
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Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
contains several restrictions that, in today's modern warfare,
essentially cripple their potential to accomplish that goal. First, for
this Geneva Convention to apply, there must be a "declared war or ...
any other armed conflict" between at least two nations that are "High
Contracting Parties" to the Convention.99 This provision establishes
two separate preconditions for a conflict to qualify for the protections
of the Geneva Convention: the conflict must be armed, and it must be
between two or more parties. 100
Although the preconditions seem straightforward and easily
satisfied, the Iraqi campaign demonstrates that they actually exempt
many modern armed conflicts from the Geneva Convention. While the
Iraq war initially began as an armed conflict between two parties (the
United States and Iraq), it later became "difficult to construe the
conflict ... in the same light."101 After passing sovereignty to the Iraqi
government in mid-2004, the President repeatedly asserted that the
United States would leave Iraq if requested by the Iraqi
government. 102 Although the conflict in Iraq was indeed armed, these
actions demonstrate that the conflict had become one "between the
Iraqi government and its allies, including the United States, and
dissident elements within Iraq."103 Thus, in this light, there would be
no armed conflict between parties to the Geneva Convention, and its
provisions would no longer apply.
Assuming that these prerequisites were met, the Geneva
Convention's ban on mercenaries would still be ineffective against a
large portion of contractors because of several important exemptions
to the definition of a mercenary. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
defines a "mercenary" as follows:
any person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; [and] (c) is motivated to
take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is
promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially
in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party ... .04
99. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
100. Captain Daniel P. Ridlon, Contractors or Illegal Combatants? The Status of Armed
Contractors in Iraq, 62 A.F L. REV. 199, 204 (2008).
101. Id. at 206.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. [hereinafter "Protocol I, Art. 47"].
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At first glance, many modern PMCs seemingly fit Protocol I's
definition of a mercenary. For those PMCs in quasi-military roles, the
hiring firm and the U.S. government specifically recruit them to fight
in armed conflicts; they often do take part in armed conflicts and are
paid substantially in excess of military personnel in similar
positions.105
Despite this initial definition comporting with the traditional
"guns for hire"106 view of mercenaries, Protocol I exempts "a national
of a Party to the conflict [and] a resident of territory controlled by a
Party to the conflict. . . ."107 These exemptions mean that any U.S.
PMC who engages in combat during a U.S. operation would not be a
mercenary and thus would not be subject to international criminal
sanctions under the Geneva Convention. Because "there is a great
deal of overlap between the nationalities of armed contractors and the
nations that most employ them,"108 many modern contractors would
not be subject to international restrictions against mercenaries. As a
result, this exemption creates "extremely inequitable ... effects on
armed contractors who are nationals of developing countries as
opposed to those who are citizens of wealthy, developed countries."109
Such inconsistency is both unfair and irrational.
For example, so long as the United States remains a party to
the Iraqi conflict, any U.S. PMC involved in that conflict would be
exempt from the Geneva Conventions' definition of a mercenary. 10 At
the same time, nationals of third-party countries would be exposed to
criminal sanctions under the Geneva Conventions. 1 ' It is illogical to
treat two individuals who commit the same crime differently based
solely on their country of origin. This inequity is further exacerbated
by the definition's requirement that mercenaries be paid substantially
higher than the military personnel of their hiring nations. Thus,
wealthy nations like the United States, who can afford to pay the high
market rate for modern PMCs, need only pay third-party nationals the
substantially lower salary given to their own military personnel. 112 If
the third-party contractor seeks to charge the market rate for his
105. Singer, supra note 96 ("[A] lance corporal or a specialist earns less than $20,000 a year
for service in Iraq, while a contractor can earn upwards of $100,000-200,000 a year (tax free) for
doing the same job and can quit whenever they want.").
106. Morgan, supra note 75, at 221.
107. Protocol I., Art. 47, supra note 104.
108. Morgan, supra note 75, at 221.
109. Id. at 223.
110. Peters, supra note 10, at 413 n.229.




services, as his U.S. counterparts in Iraq do, he could face charges as a
mercenary.113
This inconsistency is clear when one considers the Nissour
Square shootings and hypothetically assumes that one of the PMCs
involved is a U.S. national while another, who performed the exact
same actions, is from a third-party nation. Although the U.S.
contractor remains free from a mercenary classification, his
counterpart could face criminal sanctions under the Geneva
Conventions. The only way for the third-party national PMC to avoid
that possibility is to accept a substantially lower salary for performing
the same functions in the same violence-ridden area of the world. As
this hypothetical demonstrates, such an approach violates basic
principles of fairness. In the end, the line drawn between contractors
and mercenaries is unclear and inconsistent, rendering it extremely
difficult to subject modern PMCs to international criminal sanctions
under the current definition of mercenary. 14
B. Host-Nation Law
The second potential source of criminal law applicable to
modern PMCs is that of the host nation, or the territory in which the
contractors are actually employed, with the host nation using its own
court system. Because there are numerous possible host nations, each
with differing legal regimes and criminal sanctions, this Section
examines the general difficulties in applying any host nation's laws, as
opposed to problems with the laws themselves. As former U.S. Army
Captain Michael Hurst has pointed out, applying host-nation criminal
law to modern PMCs may provide several benefits to the U.S. military
in its recent contingency operations. First, because such operations
often seek "to establish a legitimate, stable, sovereign, democratic
host-nation government," the use of host-nation law over contractors
who commit crimes within the host-nation's territory against its
citizens helps establish the sovereignty of the host nation.115 Such
recognition of sovereignty reassures the local populace that the U.S.
military merely serves a temporary role in providing stability while
seeking to establish the autonomy of the host-nation.116 Thus, the
reinforcement of the U.S. military's short-term goals may garner
113. Id.
114. See id. at 221 ("[I]t is very hard to be convicted of mercenary acts.").




support for armed conflicts, or at least stave off criticism, from citizens
both domestic and abroad.
When the military operation focuses on counterinsurgency
efforts, as in the Iraq war, applying host-nation law potentially
becomes even more appealing. Because winning over the local
populace is integral to a successful counterinsurgency operation,'17
recognizing the sovereignty of the host nation assumes a heightened
level of importance. During these operations, insurgents often attempt
to destabilize local support for the host nation's government by taking
advantage of the response-or lack thereof-to perceived abuses. 1 8
Allowing the host nation to use its own courts and apply its own
criminal laws to PMCs operating within its territory would thus
"reinforce[] government legitimacy and blunt[] the ability of
insurgents to gather support by exploiting nonexistent or failed
prosecutions by U.S. officials." 119
Despite such appeal, using host-nation law as the source of
criminal law against PMCs presents several obstacles. First, the use of
host-nation law would lead to inconsistency in subjecting contractors
to numerous divergent laws. Because the U.S. military could conduct,
and indeed is currently conducting, several contingency operations
across the world, PMCs would be subject to widely varying criminal
sanctions depending upon their location of employment. Just as it is
inconsistent to hold certain PMCs accountable under international
law while relieving others of accountability solely due to nationality, it
is incongruent for two contractors who perform essentially the same
roles and commit essentially the same crimes to face different criminal
standards based solely on where they work.
Second, because PMCs are frequently employed in unstable
regions of the world that lack strong sovereign authorities, the judicial
systems of such host nations will likely be nonfunctional. 1 2 0 Until the
judicial systems of these nations function properly, any attempt to
subject contractors to host-nation law is undesirable. Captain Hurst
partially addressed this concern by proposing a tiered system for
imposing criminal sanctions against PMCs, with a preference for the
UCMJ over host-nation law until the U.S. government certifies the
host nation's legal system as functional.121 In the process, however, he
highlighted the third main criticism of using host-nation law: the
117. Thurnher, supra note 31, at 66.
118. Hurst, supra note 4, at 1317-18.
119. Id. at 1318.
120. Id. at 1311.
121. Id. at 1311-12.
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notion that "a PMC may not get a fair trial because of host-nation bias
against foreigners."122 Far from being remote, these concerns have
already manifested themselves in U.S. contingency operations. For
example, in Iraq, U.S. military officials executed a sweeping directive
that granted immunity to contractors, preventing them from being
tried in Iraqi courts. 123 Thus, all of the PMCs involved in the Nissour
Square shootings were immunized from criminal charges, at least
under Iraqi law, for their actions on Bloody Sunday. Because many
PMCs, particularly those filling quasi-military roles, are likely to be
employed in such volatile regions before any host-nation judicial
system is functional or reliably free from bias, the application of host-
nation law remains a nonviable option.
C. U.S. Civilian Law: The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
In an attempt to close the legal loophole into which PMCs had
fallen, Congress created a third potential source of criminal sanctions
against modern PMCs by passing the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA") in 2000.124 MEJA gave federal prosecutors
jurisdiction to bring criminal cases against Department of Defense
contractors and employees in U.S. courts for crimes committed abroad
that would be felonies if they had occurred within the United
States.125 Because many PMCs contract with governmental agencies
other than the Department of Defense, Congress amended MEJA in
2004 to cover contractors of any governmental agency "supporting the
mission of the Department of Defense." 126
After the Nissour Square shootings, the House of
Representatives passed the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of
2007 ("MEJA Expansion Act"), which would have extended the reach
of MEJA to all contractors "in an area, or in close proximity to an area
(as designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed
Forces is conducting a contingency operation."127 In essence, this
amendment would have brought those contractors not technically
"supporting [a] mission of the Department of Defense"128 within
MEJA's reach. Additionally, the MEJA Expansion Act sought to create
Theater Investigative Units of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
122. Id. at 1321.
123. See SCAHILL, supra note 1, at 15.
124. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2008).
125. Id. § 3261(a)(1).
126. Id. § 3267(1)(A).
127. H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. (2007).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A).
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review allegations of criminal misconduct by contractors. 129 Although
the MEJA Expansion Act passed the House of Representatives on
October 4, 2007, the Senate failed to act on the bill, thereby killing
it. 130
Even if the amendment had passed, it remains unclear if the
expanded jurisdiction and the establishment of FBI Theater
Investigative Units would alleviate the evidentiary and motivational
issues that have plagued application of MEJA to civilian contractors,
rendering it "largely impotent."131 One of the main obstacles to
MEJA's effectiveness is the difficulty in gathering evidence from
distant locations days, or even weeks, after the event. 132 Further, such
investigations often must occur in far-off war zones, and investigators
must face language barriers and severe safety concerns. 133 Asking
civilian investigators to enter these violence-ridden areas to conduct
criminal investigations is unreasonable and unrealistic. Moreover,
assuming that physical evidence could be gathered, federal
prosecutors face the daunting task of securing witnesses to testify in
the United States. 134
These evidentiary problems lead to the most difficult obstacle
to overcome: lack of prosecutorial motivation. MEJA essentially
assumes that civilian prosecutors have the knowledge and expertise to
determine what is proper conduct in military conflicts, as well as the
desire to gather evidence and depose witnesses in the middle of war
zones. 135 As Singer eloquently puts it: "The reality is that no US
Attorney likes to waste limited budgets on such messy, complex cases
9,000 miles outside their district, even if they were fortunate enough
to have the evidence at hand."136 One final impediment is the U.S.
military's need for civilian contractors to conduct its operations. With
such a strong reliance on these contractors, federal investigators and
prosecutors may face pressure to not fully investigate or prosecute
cases.137
129. H.R. 2740, § 3.
130. GovTrack, H.R. 2740: MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl10-2740.
131. Finer, supra note 3, at 263.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 264.
134. Id.
135. Singer, supra note 96.
136. Id.
137. See SCAHILL, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting military law expert Scott Horton of Human
Rights First as stating that the Department of State's investigation into the Nissour Square




Bloody Sunday provides a prime example of the difficulties in
applying MEJA to civilian contractors. Two weeks passed after the
Nissour Square shootings before an FBI investigative team traveled to
Baghdad.138 Such delay makes it nearly impossible to gather enough
reliable evidence to reach a conviction. 139 For instance, before the FBI
could examine the vehicles involved in the Nissour Square shootings,
Blackwater had repaired and repainted them, thus compromising the
evidence. 140 The official inquiry by the Department of State faced an
additional conflict of interest because the investigators' personal
safety rested in the hands of Blackwater, the very same corporation
whose personnel were the focus of the investigation. 14 1 Finally, when
the Department of State actually interviewed the Blackwater
contractors present at Nissour Square, each contractor was granted
use immunity, 142 which meant that anything a contractor said, or any
evidence gathered by virtue of what he said, could not be used in any
criminal prosecution against him. Thus, when the Department of
Justice charged five Blackwater contractors with manslaughter and
weapons violations in connection with the Nissour Square shootings, a
federal judge dismissed the case in part because of these grants of use
immunity.143 In light of the inadequacies presented by international
law, host-nation law, and MEJA, the UCMJ stands as the only
potentially viable source of criminal sanctions against PMCs.
D. The Case for the UCMJ: The Practical and Equitable Benefits
The UCMJ should supply the criminal law for PMCs because it
avoids the implementation pitfalls and unfairness presented by the
other three potential sources. First, there would be little practical
difficulty in securing evidence and witnesses for the proceedings. The
investigative unit would already be on the scene because the military
would be present in the area. For example, on Bloody Sunday, the
138. Id. at 28.
139. Id. at 27-28.
140. Id. at 31-32.
141. Id. at 28 ("[The official investigation of the Bush administration would be conducted by
the State Department, whose personnel continued to depend on the chief suspects to keep them
alive.").
142. Id. at 28 (stating that the contractors' sworn statements all began with the following: "I
... understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gathered by reason
of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding."); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 754 (7th ed. 1999) (defining use immunity as "[i]mmunity from the use of the
compelled testimony (or any information derived from that testimony) in a future prosecution
against the witness").
143. Associated Press, supra note 7.
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military arrived at Nissour Square within twenty-five minutes.144
Similarly, there would be no concern over whether the courts are
operating properly and without anti-American sentiment since the
trials would occur in functioning U.S. military courts. Third, it is
unlikely that there would be a lack of prosecutorial motivation
because military personnel would want to ensure that contractors
were held criminally accountable for strategic reasons. In modern
counterinsurgency operations, much of the battle lies in winning over
the local populace.145 For many of the inhabitants, PMCs are
indistinguishable from the U.S. military, and their actions are
attributed to U.S. forces.146 As the ones who bear the brunt of any
local backlash, high-level military personnel would likely be diligent
in bringing contractors who commit crimes to justice.
Fourth, the UCMJ provides equitable benefits because it would
apply equally to all quasi-military PMCs. That is, these PMCs would
face the same criminal sanctions under the UCMJ regardless of their
nationality, place of employment, or pay. Finally, for those soldiers
who perform quintessentially military roles on the battlefield, it is
logical to hold them to the same standards as those military personnel
that they operate alongside. It would be inequitable and unfair to
allow these contractors to escape criminal charges for their actions
while holding their military companions criminally accountable.
Despite these benefits, the constitutionality of applying the
postclarification UCMJ to modern PMCs remains untested.
IV. THE UCMJ CAN BE USED TO HOLD PMCS CRIMINALLY
ACCOUNTABLE
An examination of the constitutional framework for the
application of military law to civilians reveals that Congress's
authority to regulate the military should include the ability to subject
modern PMCs to military courts-martial for noncapital crimes with
civilian analogues, at least when the contractors perform quasi-
military roles during times of actual conflict. Article I of the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress both the specific power to "make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"147
and the plenary power to pass laws "necessary and proper" to
144. Raghavan & White, supra note 6.
145. Thurnher, supra note 31, at 66.
146. Id.
147. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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executing its constitutional responsibilities. 14 8 This Part examines the
historical application of military law to civilian contractors and
concludes that the postclarification UCMJ can be applied
constitutionally to PMCs, provided that several restrictions are
incorporated. Section A examines the use of military jurisdiction over
civilians, both pre- and post-UCMJ. Section B argues that the UCMJ,
when its application is limited to quasi-military PMCs and noncapital
crimes with civilian analogues, can provide the source of criminal law
for contractors.
A. The Constitutional Foundation
When considering Congress's power to extend military
jurisdiction to civilians, three important constitutional provisions
should be kept in mind:149 (1) the Fifth Amendment rights to
indictment by a grand jury "except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces" and to due process of law;150 (2) the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of a trial by a jury of one's peers; 15 1 and (3) Article III's
establishment of federal courts that try both civil and criminal cases
between individuals and the federal government. 152 This Section
highlights the development and interaction of these constitutional
protections by examining the pre- and post-UCMJ case law of military
jurisdiction over civilians.
1. Pre-UCMJ: The Articles of War
In 1866, the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Milligan, one of
the first cases to consider court-martial jurisdiction over civilians
under the American Articles of War. The Court held that a civilian
from Indiana with no connection to the armed forces could not
constitutionally be subject to military jurisdiction. 15 3 In finding a lack
of jurisdiction, the Court held that military jurisdiction "can never be
applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the
government, and where the courts are open and their process
148. Id. cl. 18.
149. Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 188.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. Id. amend. VI.
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, §H 1-2; see also United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11,
15 (1955) ("Article III provides for the establishment of a court system as one of the separate but
coordinate branches of the National Government. It is the primary, indeed the sole business of
these courts to try cases and controversies between individuals and between individuals and the
Government. This includes trial of criminal cases.").
153. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
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unobstructed." 1 54 At the same time, the Court emphasized that the
civilian had absolutely no connection with the military.155 This
important qualification limits Milligan's applicability to modern
PMCs, which have a definite connection to the military. Milligan
nonetheless provides several guidelines for considering the
applicability of military law to civilians: (1) civil trials are strongly
preferred over military trials; 56 (2) military jurisdiction over civilians
must be "confined to the locality of war";157 and (3) military
jurisdiction cannot exist in territories "where the courts are open, and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction."58
During the late 1800s, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of subjecting civilian paymaster clerks to military
jurisdiction. In Ex parte Reed, the Supreme Court held that military
courts had jurisdiction over civilian paymaster clerks in the Navy. 15 9
The petitioner was a duly-appointed paymaster clerk who had applied
for a writ of habeas corpus after being found guilty of malfeasance in
military court. In holding that such civilians were "in the naval
service," the Court emphasized the status of the paymaster clerks
within the structure of the Navy:
The place of paymaster's clerk is an important one in the machinery of the navy. Their
appointment must be approved by the commander of the ship. Their acceptance and
agreement to submit to the laws and regulations for the government and discipline of
the navy must be in writing, and filed in the department. They must take an oath, and
bind themselves to serve until discharged. The discharge must be by the appointing
power, and approved in the same manner as the appointment. They are required to
wear the uniform of the service; they have a fixed rank; they are upon the payroll, and
are paid accordingly. They may also become entitled to a pension and to bounty land.
The good order and efficiency of the service depend largely upon the faithful
performance of their duties. If these officers are not in the naval service, it may well be
asked who are.'6o
Since civilian paymaster clerks were deemed part of the Navy,
the Court denied the writ and held that the "constitutionality of the
acts of Congress touching army and navy courts-martial in this
country, if there could ever have been a doubt about it, is no longer an
open question in this court." 61
154. Id.
155. Id. at 121-22.
156. Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 191.
157. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
158. Id.
159. 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879).
160. Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 21.
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Similarly, in Johnson v. Sayre, the Court denied a writ of
habeas corpus for a civilian paymaster clerk who had been convicted of
embezzlement in a military court. 162 Again, the Court viewed the clerk
as in the Navy and thus within Congress's power to regulate the
armed forces.163 Johnson also demonstrates Congress's power to
provide for use of courts-martial over civilians during both times of
war and peace.164 Thus, these paymaster cases demonstrate that some
civilians are so intricately involved with the military that they can be
deemed "in" the military and thus subject to military law, regardless
of the existence of hostilities.
2. Post-UCMJ: From Quarles to McElroy
Five years after the Congress passed the UCMJ in 1950, the
Supreme Court held in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles that
military jurisdiction could not extend to ex-military persons who had
"severed all relationship with the military and its institutions."165
Quarles involved an ex-Air Force member who had been honorably
discharged five months prior to the court-martial for murder.166 By
restricting court-martial jurisdiction to actual members of the armed
forces, the Court specifically desired to avoid an encroachment on the
jurisdiction of Article III courts. The Court also emphasized the
procedural differences between military tribunals and civilian courts
with a particular regard for the Fifth Amendment guarantee to trial
by jury.167 Quarles thus makes clear that Article III and the Fifth
Amendment prohibit application of military law to civilians with no
current connection to the military.
While Quarles dealt with Congress's general constitutional
powers over the armed forces with regard to ex-military personnel, the
Supreme Court specifically dealt with the applicability of the UCMJ to
civilians in Reid v. Covert.168 At the time, the UCMJ applied to
"persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
outside the United States."169 Covert was tried and convicted under
court-martial for murdering her husband, a sergeant in the Air Force,
162. 158 U.S. 109, 118 (1895).
163. Id. at 114, 117.
164. Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 191.
165. 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955).
166. Id. at 13.
167. Id. at 18 ("[The premise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or
imnocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists . . . [and this] idea is
inherent in the institution of trial by jury.").
168. 354 U.S. 1, 3 (1957).
169. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(11) (Supp. V 1957).
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while living on a military base in England.170 In a plurality opinion,
the Court held that military jurisdiction could not be extended to
civilian dependents living with servicemen overseas because "[t]he
term 'land and naval Forces' refers to persons who are members of the
armed services and not to their civilian wives, children and other
dependents."'71 As in Quarles, the Court emphasized that the Fifth
Amendment right to trial by jury and the Sixth Amendment right to
due process restricted the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause as
applied to the regulation of armed forces. 172 At the same time, the
plurality examined Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ and noted that a
person "could be 'in' the armed services . . . even though he had not
formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform."173
Such a classification could only occur during times of actual conflict
when, "[i]n the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders
necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront."174
In the companion cases of Grisham v. Hagan75 and McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo,176 the Court restricted the scope of
military jurisdiction in the context of a civilian employee of the armed
forces, as opposed to a civilian dependent of a member of the armed
forces. Grisham involved a civilian employee of the Army stationed in
France who was charged with premeditated murder under the
UCMJ.177 The Court held that when a capital offense is charged under
the UCMJ, the defendant should be afforded the constitutional right
to a trial by jury because of the irreversibility of the death penalty. 78
In McElroy, the Court held that military jurisdiction could not
constitutionally extend to civilian employees charged with noncapital
crimes, at least in peacetime. 79 The defendant, an electrical lineman
for the Air Force, was convicted of larceny and conspiracy to commit
larceny while stationed near Morocco.o80 While acknowledging the
170. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3.
171. Id. at 20-21.
172. Id. at 10 ("Trial by jury in a court of law and in accordance with traditional modes of
procedure after an indictment by grand jury has served and remains one of our most vital
barriers to governmental arbitrariness. These elemental procedural safeguards were embedded
in our Constitution to secure their inviolateness and sanctity against the passing demands of
expediency or convenience.").
173. Id. at 22-23.
174. Id. at 33.
175. 361 U.S. 278, 278-79 (1960).
176. 361 U.S. 281, 282 (1960).
177. 361 U.S. at 279.
178. Id. at 280.




historical evidence of court-martial jurisdiction over sutlers and
retainers, the Court found this evidence "too episodic, too meager, to
form a solid basis in history, preceding and contemporaneous with the
framing of the Constitution, for constitutional adjudication." 8 1 At the
same time, the Court noted that "procedure along the lines of that
used by the navy as to paymasters' clerks might offer a practical
alternative to the use of civilian employees by the armed services." 182
The application of the UCMJ to civilians seemed to be laid to
rest by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Averette.183
The court construed the application of the UCMJ to civilians "in times
of war" to be restricted to "a war formally declared by Congress."1 8 4
The "clarification" that the UCMJ applies to civilian contractors,
combined with the dramatic increase in the number of civilian
contractors filling quasi-military roles, suggests that a new
examination into the constitutionality of Congress's expansion of
military jurisdiction is warranted.
B. The Case for the UCMJ: Solving the Constitutional Conundrum
Although prior case law fails to deal directly with the situation
facing modern PMCs, the Supreme Court has laid out several guiding
factors. First, Milligan demonstrates that there is generally a strong
preference for using civilian courts over military courts when trying
civilians, at least when the civilian courts are open and functioning.185
While Milligan seems to hold that military courts-martial should not
be utilized against civilians, this case was limited to a person with no
connection to the military whatsoever. 86 At the same time, Reed and
Johnson maintain that military jurisdiction over civilians is justifiable
when civilian employees are deemed to be members of the armed
services, such as Navy paymaster clerks.'87 As Quarles, Reid, and
McElroy make clear, such jurisdiction must respect the constitutional
boundaries set by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and cannot occur
without active hostilities. 88 Finally, McElroy provides a potential
181. Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 64 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
182. Id. at 285.
183. 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970).
184. Id. at 365.
185. Id. at 116.
186. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Modern PMCs, particularly those PMCs who perform quasi-
military functions alongside members of the armed services, clearly have a definite relationship
with the military.
187. See supra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 165-182 and accompanying text.
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solution that would remain within those constitutional boundaries:
the implementation of an approach similar to those found in the Navy
paymaster clerk cases.189
Critics may initially argue that any application of the UCMJ to
PMCs during contingency operations is analogous to the jurisdiction
in Quarles, which the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional.
There, the jurisdiction was extended to an individual who had severed
all ties with the military. Allowing such jurisdiction, the Court
concluded, would encroach upon the federal courts' Article III
powers. 190 In addition, the Quarles Court emphasized the inherent
differences between military courts-martial and Article III courts,
"where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional
safeguards .... " 191 These critics could also highlight the Milligan
Court's establishment of a powerful preference for civilian trials as
opposed to military trials.192
Despite the general preference for civilian courts expressed in
Quarles and Milligan, Article III provides that criminal trials "shall be
held in the State where the . .. Crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place
or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."193 Because the
UCMJ applies only to persons accompanying armed forces in the field
during contingency operations, most, if not all, crimes committed by
modern contractors will be committed abroad. As such, they will not
be committed within any state, and Congress retains the power to
determine where such crimes shall be prosecuted. As Professor
William C. Peters pointed out, "Congress has directed, through
appropriate legislation in the form of the UCMJ, that when civilians
accompanying an armed force in the field during time of war commit
crimes 'not within any state,' they may be tried by courts-martial
wherever they are found."194 Professor Peters also emphasized the
general principle that Congress's discretionary power to create federal
courts inferior to the Supreme Court'95 necessarily includes the power
to define the scope of their jurisdiction.196
189. 361 U.S. 281, 285 (1960).
190. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955).
191. Id.
192. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
193. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
194. Peters, supra note 10, at 406.
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (giving Congress the power to create inferior courts but not
explicitly requiring it).
196. Peters, supra note 10, at 406.
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Additionally, the Supreme Court has expressed that Congress's
power to regulate the armed forces is quite broad, at least when
applied to those who are actual members of the armed forces. 197 The
section that contains the clause granting Congress power to regulate
the military also includes clauses conferring the powers to borrow
money, regulate interstate commerce, coin money, and declare war. 98
Thus, the Court found "no indication that the grant of power ... was
any less plenary than the grants of other authority to Congress in the
same section."199 Because the UCMJ applies only during contingency
operations and only where the civilian is accompanying an armed
force in the field, any geographical or temporal concerns should be
alleviated. These constraints should help bring the postclarification
UCMJ within Congress's broad plenary powers to regulate the armed
forces.
Taking all of these factors into consideration, subjecting
modern PMCs to criminal sanctions under the UCMJ will be
constitutional if certain limitations are implemented. First, the U.S.
military should immediately and systematically include provisions
subjecting modern contractors to the UCMJ in its contracts with
private military firms and individual PMCs. Second, the UCMJ should
only be applied to those PMCs who perform quasi-military roles. In
other words, it should be limited to those contractors who can be seen
as functional members of the military-whether formally inducted
into the military. Finally, only noncapital provisions of the UCMJ that
have civilian analogues, such as murder or robbery, should be used.
An examination of each of these elements reveals that such an
approach to holding PMCs criminally accountable under the UCMJ
would be constitutional.
1. Including Notifications in PMC Contracts
The starting point for solving this constitutional conundrum is
to capitalize on the Supreme Court's suggestion in McElroy to
implement procedures similar to those approved for Navy paymaster
clerks in Reed and Johnson. According to Singer, the clarification of
the UCMJ "is the 21st century business version of the rights
contract."200 In other words, the UCMJ provides the means by which
modern PMCs can contract away their Fifth and Sixth Amendment
197. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987).
198. Id. (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8).
199. Id.
200. Singer, supra note 96.
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rights in order to be employed by the U.S. military during contingency
operations. 201 Where Singer errs, however, is in assuming that the
clarification itself provides the proper contractual basis and
notification to contractors that they are subject to military courts-
martial.202
As the Reed Court pointed out, a key factor in subjecting Navy
paymaster clerks to military jurisdiction was their agreement to
submit to military jurisdiction in a signed writing.203 Such a contract-
based approach is also appropriate in the context of PMCs. In fact,
after the Nissour Square shootings, the Department of Defense
attempted to strengthen its control over PMCs by altering the terms of
their contracts.204 Although this emphasis on a written agreement
would mean that the UCMJ could not be retroactively applied to
contractors currently under contract, an immediate and systematic
inclusion of a written provision in PMCs' contracts presents a forward-
looking solution to holding future PMCs accountable in military
courts.
A written-acknowledgment requirement would help prevent
Fifth and Sixth Amendment objections to subjecting civilians to
military jurisdiction by serving as the functional equivalent of an
enlistment contract, waiving constitutional rights not found in
military courts-martial. 205 Although such a contractual provision
would help the constitutionality of the UCMJ as applied to PMCs,
more limitations would likely be needed under Reed and Johnson,
given the Supreme Court's strong preference for civilian courts over
military courts-martial.
201. Id. ("If a private individual wants to travel to a warzone to do military jobs for profit, on
behalf of the US government, then that individual agrees to fall under the same codes of law and
consequence that American soldiers, in the same zones, doing the same sorts of jobs, have to live
and work by.").
202. Id. (noting that the new law could be applied as is to currently contracted civilians and
to embedded journalists, who are not under contract).
203. 100 U.S. 13, 22 (1879).
204. Thurnher, supra note 31, at 82-83 (describing how the Department of Defense altered
the terms of contracts with PMCs by creating an affirmative duty for PMCs to report criminal
conduct to commanders, mandating compliance with the military commander's orders, and, in
one instance, specifying the situations in which weapons may be used).
205. Jackson, supra note 13, at 288.
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2. Applying Only to Quasi-Military PMCs
The UCMJ should only be applied to quasi-military PMCs
because the contractual waiver of rights by contractors would likely
not eliminate the need to consider whether modern PMCs are "in" the
military. The Supreme Court's decision in McElroy tacitly
acknowledged the requirement of contractors being considered "in" the
military when it described procedures similar to those applied to Navy
paymaster clerks as "a practical alternative to the use of civilian
employees by the armed services."206 Additionally, the Court based its
holdings in Reed and Johnson on Navy paymaster clerks both
submitting to military jurisdiction in writing and being "in" the
military to some extent.207
Critics may contend that the Reed Court's holding that Navy
paymasters were "in" the armed forces was based on numerous factors
that do not apply to even quasi-military personnel. For example, the
Court emphasized that Navy officials needed to approve their
appointment and discharge and that they were on the Navy payroll. 208
However, such a narrow focus ignores the central point of Reed: Navy
paymaster clerks were essential to the "good order and efficiency" of
the Navy. 209 In modern times, the unprecedented reliance on
contractors indicates that they have become an indispensible asset to
the U.S. military.210 In particular, quasi-military PMCs provide
tactical support on the front lines of hostile conflicts.211 This is exactly
where military commanders must have broad authority to govern
those involved. 212 Finally, quasi-military PMCs are ones who have
taken over quintessential soldier roles: wearing uniforms, bearing
arms, and being on the battlefield. 213 The locals often cannot
distinguish between quasi-military PMCs and U.S. military
personnel. 214 As the Reed Court emphasized with respect to Navy
paymaster clerks, if these quasi-military PMCs are "not in the ...
service, it may well be asked who are."215
206. 361 U.S. 281, 285 (1960) (emphasis added).
207. Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 118 (1895); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 22 (1879).
208. Reed, 100 U.S. at 22.
209. Id.
210. Peters, supra note 10, at 383.
211. SINGER, supra note 15, at 92.
212. Reed, 100 U.S. at 22.
213. See Wood, supra note 17, at 95.
214. Thurnher, supra note 31, at 66.
215. Reed, 100 U.S. at 22.
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This limitation also resolves one of the main criticisms of the
postclarification UCMJ: it is overbroad because it could conceivably be
applied to any civilian accompanying military forces during
contingency operations. 216 For example, during the enactment of the
original UCMJ, the assistant general counsel of the Department of
Defense lamented that military jurisdiction could be extended to Red
Cross workers and embedded journalists.217 However, the application
of the UCMJ to PMCs would likely only face as-applied overbreadth
challenges because the Supreme Court recently disapproved of facial
overbreadth challenges. 218 In the 2004 case of Sabri v. United States,
the Court stated that facial challenges should be infrequent and that,
"[a]lthough passing on the validity of a law wholesale may be efficient
in the abstract, ... [flacial adjudication carries too much promise of
premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually bare-
bones records."219 Thus, it is seemingly irrelevant that the UCMJ may
apply to any civilian accompanying the armed forces. Instead, cases
will likely focus upon whether the particular application at issue is
overbroad. Restricting the applicability of the contractual provision to
those contractors filling quasi-military roles should alleviate
overbreadth concerns and help ensure that the individual would be
deemed "in" the military when faced with an as-applied constitutional
challenge.
Critics may argue that limiting the application of the UCMJ to
only quasi-military PMCs would be just as unfair as the
inconsistencies found in international and host-nation law because it
differentiates based solely on the contractors' roles and functions.
However, this criticism is largely meritless. Since most modern U.S.
military conflicts involve counterinsurgency efforts that seek to win
the support of the local populace, the United States must
pragmatically focus on changing the perception that egregious abuses
will go unpunished. In the event that a non-quasi-military PMC
commits such an egregious crime, MEJA remains a secondary, but less
effective, source of criminal sanctions. If a contractor is deemed non-
quasi-military, that means that he was likely not on the battlefield,
and the dangers of investigation would be alleviated.
Additionally, the UCMJ should only be applied to those PMCs
who perform quintessential roles. The UCMJ does not contain
numerous constitutional safeguards available in U.S. civilian
216. Finer, supra note 3, at 262.
217. Corn, supra note 48, at 518-19.
218. Sacilotto, supra note 46, at 209 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)).
219. 541 U.S. at 608-09.
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courts.220 If a contractor does not perform the quintessential functions
of a soldier, it is unfair and unconstitutional to subject him to the
rigors of a military court-martial. For quasi-military PMCs, it is both
fair and consistent to hold them criminally accountable under the
same standards as those military personnel with whom they operate
on the battlefront.
3. Limiting Initially to Noncapital Crimes with Civilian Analogues
Limiting the application of the UCMJ to noncapital crimes
with civilian analogues, at least initially, avoids two potential
problems. First, confining the applicable crimes to those that do not
result in the death penalty would avoid Grisham's admonition against
trying civilians by court-martial for capital crimes. Second, the
inability to charge quasi-military PMCs with capital crimes would not
seriously undermine the UCMJ as the most viable source of criminal
law, given that many charges would still be available to bring justice
to victims and to ensure the success of U.S. efforts to win over local
communities. Recent history demonstrates that the UCMJ would be at
least as substantively viable as MEJA even if it did not apply to
capital crimes; here, recall that the Blackwater contractors involved in
Bloody Sunday were only charged with manslaughter under MEJA.221
Additionally, limiting the preliminary applications of the
UCMJ to those charges with civilian analogues will help avoid a
second overbreadth argument. Critics may argue that the UCMJ
would subject contractors to purely military regulations, such as those
pertaining to sexual orientation or disparagement of the Commander
in Chief.222 They may point to the UCMJ's catchall provision and
argue that it will "trigger substantial due process concerns" when
applied to civilians.223 However, similar to the restriction to quasi-
military PMCs, the limitation to crimes with civilian analogues will
help avoid an as-applied overbreadth challenge. The catchall provision
could be used to invoke those charges with civilian analogues that are
not specifically laid out in the UCMJ. This provision should not raise
220. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
221. Associated Press, supra note 7.
222. Corn, supra note 48, at 524 ("[Tlhis jurisdiction is not restricted to criminal offenses
normally applicable to civilians.. . . Instead, in addition to the UCMJ prohibitions against what
could reasonably be considered civilian offenses, every other offense established by the UCMJ is
applicable to civilian augmentees . . . includ[ing] offenses unique to the military, such as
disobedience to orders, disrespect toward superiors, absence without authority, desertion,
missing movement, and misbehavior before an enemy."); Finer, supra note 3, at 262. See
generally notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
223. Corn, supra note 48, at 525.
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due process concerns, as quasi-military PMCs would already be on
notice that they could face these charges by virtue of MEJA and their
newly added contractual provisions. Thus, the UCMJ would supply
most of the same charges as MEJA while avoiding its practical
pitfalls.
It remains unclear whether this limitation is even necessary,
given that the Supreme Court has allowed purely military charges to
be brought against civilians. For example, in Reed, the Supreme Court
upheld a conviction for malfeasance because the civilian Navy
paymaster clerk was deemed "in" the military.224 Thus, if a quasi-
military PMC is indeed a functional member of the military, then he
conceivably could be charged with a crime that lacks a civilian
analogue. To avoid compounding and complicating the issues, this
scenario should be avoided in the beginning stages of applying the
UCMJ to quasi-military PMCs. Initial cases should focus solely on
establishing that quasi-military PMCs must be sufficiently "in" the
military in order to be subject to the UCMJ. Following that finding,
such contractors should then be susceptible to charges of any crime
under the UCMJ.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Blackwater example emphasizes, action must be taken
in order to hold quasi-military PMCs accountable for their criminal
actions. The United States simply cannot allow them to continue to
operate as the Untouchables. The consequences that can flow from the
military's failure to oversee its own private contractors are
demonstrated by the Iraqi backlash to Bloody Sunday and the
banning of Blackwater PMCs from Iraq. If the U.S. military wishes to
continue to rely on high levels of quasi-military PMCs in contingency
operations, it must hold them criminally accountable or risk losing
their support altogether.
By clarifying the UCMJ in 2007, Congress has determined that
U.S. military law is the most viable source of criminal law applicable
to contractors. In order to be placed firmly within the constitutional
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court, several restrictions on the
application of the UCMJ should be implemented: (1) the application of
the UCMJ should be limited to quasi-military PMCs; (2) the
applicable provisions of the UCMJ should be limited to those with
civilian analogues; and (3) the government should begin to incorporate
these changes and acknowledgments of them in the contracts signed
224. 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879).
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by the providing firms and the individual PMCs. With these
limitations, military prosecutors will be able to wield the tool provided
by Congress and bring the Untouchables within the grasp of criminal
law.
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